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The seasonal flu kills approximately 36,000 to 40,000 people and hos-pitalizes more than 200,000 in the United States each year.1 Annually,
influenza costs the national economy over $10 billion in lost productivity and
direct medical expenses.2 Many view the flu as a relatively predictable and
manageable health threat.   
Recently, however, health experts worldwide
have been sounding the alarm about a differ-
ent type of flu.  They warn of the “inevitable”
emergence of a new, severe strain of the flu
virus against which people have no immunity
to protect them.3 This could result in a rapidly
spreading, worldwide epidemic of this new
potentially lethal strain of the disease, which
scientists refer to as a “pandemic.”4 New strains
of the flu traditionally emerge in animals, often
in poultry and pigs, and then as the disease
develops over time, it can become transmitted
to humans.  The severity of an emerging pan-
demic would be determined by the particular
strain of the new form of the virus and how eas-
ily contagious it proves to be in humans.
The World Health Organization (WHO),
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), and other health authorities believe
that the emergence of a pandemic flu could
be devastating to world health and econom-
ic stability.  
 In the U.S., projection models predict that
a pandemic may cause over a half a million
deaths and two million hospitalizations.5
 The estimated economic impact of a pan-
demic flu outbreak in the U.S. today,
based on projections from the relatively
mild 1968 flu epidemic, would be $71.3 to
$166.5 billion due to death and lost pro-
ductivity, excluding other “disruptions to
commerce and society.”6
The U.S. would be impacted by the global
implications as soon as a pandemic out-
break occurred in any part of the world due
to the interdependence of economies.
Sectors, such as hospitals and the health
care system, which rely on supplies manu-
factured in other parts of the world, includ-
ing Asia, would feel immediate repercus-
sions and supply shortages.  Travel restric-
tions, possible limitations on public gather-
ings and events, and other measures taken
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2to limit the spread of disease would also
have rapid and far reaching repercussions.
Since a pandemic could likely result in polit-
ical and economic destabilization, particu-
larly in developing countries, it poses seri-
ous national security concerns for the U.S.
Based on historical trends and projections,
virologists and epidemiologists predict a
new flu pandemic will emerge three to four
times each century.8 Health officials around
the world are troubled by the severity of the
“avian flu” circulating in Asia, which scien-
tists refer to as the H5N1 flu strain.  They
fear this avian flu could become the next
pandemic for humans.  The regional direc-
tor of the WHO for the Western Pacific
region stated in February 2005 that the
“world is now in the gravest possible danger
of a pandemic.”9
 As of June 17, 2005, this "bird flu" virus
has killed 54 individuals and has spread
rapidly among bird populations.10
 As of April 2005, the strain seems to be
exhibiting a mortality rate of over 50 per-
cent in humans.  Experts are concerned
that when the mortality rate decreases,
the virus’s transmission rate will increase.  
 Health officials are concerned that the
avian virus could become more conta-
gious among humans, and that it could
remain in a strain against which humans
have no natural resistance.  
 CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, the Asian
investment banking arm of Crédit Agricole
of France, estimates that avian influenza
has already cost the impacted region in
Asia $8 to $12 billion, mostly from lost rev-
enue from poultry and related industries.11 





OF THE CENTER FOR
INFECTIOUS DISEASE
RESEARCH AND POLICY
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
MINNESOTA, WROTE
THAT “EVEN A RELATIVELY
‘MILD’ PANDEMIC COULD
KILL MANY MILLIONS OF
PEOPLE” WORLDWIDE.7
I AM ACUTELY AWARE OF THE DISASTER THAT A PANDEMIC COULD CAUSE.  
MANY OF US ARE PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT H5N1 AVIAN INFLUENZA VIRUS, 
AND WE’RE RIGHT TO WORRY.  IT HAS INFECTED AT LEAST 89 HUMAN BEINGS
AND KILLED MORE THAN HALF.  THERE IS A CHANCE THAT THIS VIRUS COULD CAUSE
THE NEXT PANDEMIC12
– U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt, May 16, 2005   
“
”
1918 – The “Spanish” flu pandemic killed
500,000 in the U.S., 50 million worldwide. 
1957–58 – An outbreak spread from
China across the globe, killing approxi-
mately 70,000 in the U.S.  In April 2005, a
company testing laboratory proficiency
mistakenly distributed samples of this pan-
demic strain to laboratories worldwide,
triggering global concern until all samples
were accounted for and destroyed.14
1968–69 – The “Hong Kong” flu, the most
recent pandemic, affected millions world-
wide and disrupted world economies.  
1997 – The first identification of the avian
“bird” flu, which remains active in Asia.15
MAJOR FLU OUTBREAKS OF THE 20TH CENTURY13
“
”
SINCE JANUARY 2004, EVENTS AFFECTING BOTH HUMAN AND ANIMAL HEALTH HAVE BROUGHT
THE WORLD CLOSER TO AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE 1968.  WHEREAS PAST PAN-
DEMICS HAVE CONSISTENTLY ANNOUNCED THEMSELVES WITH AN EXPLOSION OF CASES, EVENTS DURING
2004, SUPPORTED BY EPIDEMIOLOGICAL AND VIROLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE, HAVE GIVEN THE WORLD AN
UNPRECEDENTED WARNING THAT A PANDEMIC MAY BE IMMINENT.  THEY ALSO HAVE OPENED AN UNPRECE-
DENTED OPPORTUNITY TO ENHANCE PREPAREDNESS.
– Report by the WHO Secretariat, April 200516
3While experts predict a pandemic flu is
“inevitable,” subsequent deaths in the United
States predicted to be over a half million peo-
ple are not.  Increasing federal leadership,
converting national and state pandemic
influenza plans into operational blueprints,
procuring adequate antiviral medication for
treatment, and putting a process in place
now for rapid influenza vaccine approval are
all steps that should be taken immediately. 
Protecting the U.S. and the world against the
threat of a pandemic would, at the same time,
better prepare countries for threats posed by
infectious illnesses, including the intentional
spread of disease by terrorists.  The threat of a
pandemic influenza outbreak was highlighted
by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) as one of 15 disaster planning scenar-
ios for which the U.S. should be prepared.
In order to help understand the current sta-
tus of U.S. preparations and highlight ways to
improve them, in the following report, Trust
for America’s Health (TFAH) provides:
 A state-by-state examination of potential
deaths and hospitalizations due to a flu
pandemic based on model estimates;  
 A state-by-state examination of capacity
to treat citizens with recommended
antivirals based on model estimates;
 A review of U.S. and state pandemic
readiness, including a comparison to
other nations’ progress; and
 Recommendations for improved pandemic
readiness.
Overall, the report finds: 
 Despite the health and economic 
implications of such an event, pandemic
planning efforts are lagging in the U.S.,
especially when compared to the United
Kingdom and Canada.  
 The U.S. has not assessed or planned for
the disruption a flu pandemic could
cause both to the economy and society as
a whole.  This includes daily life consid-
erations, such as potential school and
workplace closures, potential travel and
mass transit restrictions, and the poten-
tial need to close stores resulting in com-
plications in the delivery of food and
basic supplies to people.  Daily life and
economic problems would likely emerge
in the U.S. even before the pandemic flu
hit the country due to the global interde-
pendence of the world economy.   
 Aspects of the planning process, such as
ensuring vaccine and antiviral capabili-
ties and surge capacity readiness, are
incomplete or fragmented.  
 The failure to establish a cohesive, rapid,
and transparent U.S. pandemic strategy
could prove a major weakness against a
virulent and efficient virus -- putting
Americans needlessly at risk.   
I would like to emphasize that although we cannot be certain exactly when the next 
influenza pandemic will occur, we can be virtually certain that one will occur and that the resulting
morbidity, mortality, and economic disruption would present extraordinary challenges to public
health authorities around the world.
– Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National
Institutes of Health, Department of Health and Human Services 17
Today, many influenza experts, including those at CDC, consider the threat of a serious 
influenza pandemic to the United States to be high. Although the timing and impact of an influenza
pandemic is unpredictable, the occurrence is inevitable and potentially devastating.





4In order to illustrate the potential severity of a
pandemic outbreak in the U.S., the chart
below uses one model based on assumptions
from the current avian flu outbreak.
Scientists have used a number of different
models to estimate the scope and impact of
the emergence of a new strain of the flu.  The
basic U.S. planning model is based on
assumptions from the 1968 “Hong Kong”
pandemic flu, which was considered to be rel-
atively mild.  Experts also have predicted
higher and lower estimates based on different
sets of assumptions. The numbers below
adapt the model to reflect moderate assump-
tions for the current avian flu threat.  
1. The WHO has estimated that there would
be a “contraction” rate of 25 percent for
this flu strain.  This means they warn that
countries should be prepared for approx-
imately 25 percent of their populations to
get sick from the pandemic virus.  Other
scientists have estimated that up to 50
percent of countries’ populations could
become infected.  
2. The current strain of the avian flu is
viewed as significantly more lethal than the
1968 pandemic flu strain.  A high-level
pandemic, such as the 1918 pandemic, is
considered to be six times more lethal
than the 1968 flu.19 The projections below
reflect a mid-level estimate of a three times
higher rate.  These numbers are reflected
in the “Projected Dead” column in the
table below.  The range of estimates, from
low level to high level severity death rates,
can be found in Appendix A.
3. Due to the severity of the avian flu strain,
experts also believe that it would result in a
much higher hospitalization rate than esti-
mates using the 1968 strain.  The estimates
below, in the “Projected Hospitalizations”
column, reflect a mid-level estimate of a
three times higher rate.  A more virulent
strain of flu, changes in medical care and
treatment procedures, and an aged popu-
lation are all factors behind this projection.
The range of estimates, from low level to
high level severity hospitalization rates, can
be found in Appendix A.
Model Estimates of the Impact of a Severe-Strain Flu Virus Epidemic
To assist state and local health agencies with pandemic readiness, CDC developed a computer model
(FluAid 2.0) that generates mortality, hospitalization, and outpatient rates for different age popula-
tions on a state-by-state basis.20 FluAid derives its default numbers from the 1968 Hong Kong pan-
demic, which had a relatively minor impact on the U.S.  According to Dr. Keiji Fukuda, the Chief of
Epidemiology and Surveillance Section, Influenza Branch at CDC’s National Center for Infectious
Diseases, a high severity pandemic, similar to the 1918 pandemic outbreak, may have a mortality rate
of six times the 1968 pandemic.21 To estimate the potential impact from a H5N1 pandemic on the
U.S., the following projections multiplied the default FluAid mortality rate for each state and each age
group by three (the mid-point between the default numbers and the possible six times mortality
rate); hospitalization rates are also three times the default FluAid number.  
Projections of deaths and hospitalizations from an H5N1 pandemic are only estimates.
Variables including the virulence of the virus, its attack rate, and the success of preventative
and controlling measures (including the use of antiviral medication and the development of a
vaccine) would influence the actual total.  While the mortality estimate provided below  --  a
U.S. death toll over a half a million persons  --  varies from some other experts’ forecasts, all
projections agree on a critical point: the risk of a pandemic is serious enough to justify urgent
steps to improve U.S. ability to fight this virus if it starts to spread.  
It is also important to note that planning and accommodating for the surge of sick patients presents
a separate, massive challenge to the health care system  --  a consideration that the projected death
toll should not overshadow.  The impact of over two million hospitalized patients would test and pos-
sibly overwhelm the surge capacity of hospitals nationwide.   For instance, according to the American
Hospital Association, in 2003 there are only 965,256 staffed hospital beds in registered hospitals.22
POTENTIAL IMPACT: STATE BY STATE ANALYSIS
5As of May 2005, the U.S. has stockpiled 2.3
million courses of the antiviral medication
Tamiflu, which could be used as a treatment
in the event of an outbreak, and intends to
order approximately three million more with
funds recently appropriated by Congress to
total 5.3 million.  The WHO is currently esti-
mating that an avian flu epidemic could
impact 25 percent of countries’ populations.
In the U.S., this means it could affect nearly
67 million individuals, based on FluAid pro-
jections and population numbers.  With the
current level of the U.S. Tamiflu order, over
61.5 million Americans who could be infected
would not receive antiviral medication. If the U.S.
orders additional courses of Tamiflu, they
would not be available until 2007, unless pro-
duction capacity significantly changes.
TABLE 1: Potential Pandemic Influenza Deaths and Hospitalizations
From a Mid-level Pandemic Flu*
State Projected Dead Projected Hospitalized Number of Cases
Alabama 8,886 38,591 1,079,789
Alaska 886 4,558 152,328
Arizona 9,223 39,675 1,138,742
Arkansas 5,350 22,660 630,705
California 60,875 273,090 8,067,075
Colorado 7,192 32,978 973,161
Connecticut 7,054 29,932 817,465
Delaware 1,507 6,560 182,895
District of Columbia 1,155 4,974 132,241
Florida 35,737 142,386 3,663,486
Georgia 13,655 62,912 1,871,561
Hawaii 2,446 10,571 296,651
Idaho 2,279 10,157 302,558
Illinois 23,720 103,738 2,973,962
Indiana 11,817 51,711 1,466,027
Iowa 6,233 26,090 713,106
Kansas 5,373 22,946 654,335
Kentucky 7,930 34,748 977,031
Louisiana 8,334 37,148 1,087,942
Maine 2,651 11,333 310,513
Maryland 9,958 44,500 1,273,572
Massachusetts 13,136 56,038 1,529,313
Michigan 19,622 86,005 2,443,473
Minnesota 9,304 40,786 1,171,387
Mississippi 5,362 23,531 682,625
Missouri 11,274 48,240 1,350,515
Montana 1,804 7,787 219,703
Nebraska 3,441 14,697 414,218
Nevada 3,243 14,455 419,202
New Hampshire 2,333 10,301 293,177
New Jersey 16,980 72,791 2,013,212
New Mexico 3,244 14,504 432,438
New York 37,701 162,490 4,534,307
North Carolina 14,987 65,637 1,856,296
North Dakota 1,371 5,795 160,221
Ohio 23,197 99,979 2,796,583
Oklahoma 6,833 29,376 829,273
Oregon 6,724 29,047 810,872
Pennsylvania 27,185 112,658 3,004,915
Rhode Island 2,234 9,263 246,857
South Carolina 7,474 32,983 940,045
South Dakota 1,559 6,599 184,493
Tennessee 10,875 47,678 1,342,050
Texas 35,124 160,648 4,859,834
Utah 3,393 15,906 514,787
Vermont 1,185 5,213 147,245
Virginia 13,104 58,872 1,683,499
Washington 10,910 48,610 1,402,591
West Virginia 4,049 17,014 453,947
Wisconsin 10,620 45,842 1,292,419
Wyoming 915 4,086 119,936
U.S. Totals 541,433 2,358,089 66,914,573
* Projections are based on CDC’s FluAid 2.0 program.  The estimated deaths are for a pandemic strain three times more
lethal than the 1968 pandemic, on which the default FluAid numbers are based.  The hospitalization rate is three times
the default 1968 rate.  The Dead and Hospitalized numbers represent the most likely FluAid projection at a 25% rate of
contraction. The Number of Cases is the projected number of residents contracting the flu, based on a 25% rate of con-
traction.  State population numbers are from FluAid, using U.S. Census data gathered in 1999.  Updated population data
were not used to ensure consistency with estimated Dead and Hospitalized numbers. 
6In an actual pandemic, there would likely be
geographic concentrations of the disease,
especially in the initial stages of an outbreak.
U.S. government officials may decide to
“front-end” target the limited supply geo-
graphically in hopes of containing the initial
spread.  However, it is likely that the pan-
demic would still spread to the remainder of
the country.  As a result of the pandemic’s
national scope and lacking a prioritized dis-
tribution plan, these projections assume that
the U.S. would use proportional distribution
(based on population) in delivering the
remaining Tamiflu courses.  
TABLE 2: State-by-State Capacity to Treat Citizens with 
Recommended Antiviral*
State Number of Tamiflu Number of Cases Number of Cases Courses Available Without Tamiflu
Alabama 85,525 1,079,789 994,263
Alaska 12,065 152,328 140,263
Arizona 90,195 1,138,742 1,048,547
Arkansas 49,955 630,705 580,749
California 638,956 8,067,075 7,428,119
Colorado 77,080 973,161 896,081
Connecticut 64,748 817,465 752,717
Delaware 14,486 182,895 168,409
District of Columbia 10,474 132,241 121,767
Florida 290,168 3,663,486 3,373,318
Georgia 148,238 1,871,561 1,723,323
Hawaii 23,496 296,651 273,154
Idaho 23,964 302,558 278,594
Illinois 235,554 2,973,962 2,738,408
Indiana 116,117 1,466,027 1,349,910
Iowa 56,482 713,106 656,624
Kansas 51,827 654,335 602,508
Kentucky 77,386 977,031 899,645
Louisiana 86,171 1,087,942 1,001,771
Maine 24,594 310,513 285,918
Maryland 100,874 1,273,572 1,172,698
Massachusetts 121,130 1,529,313 1,408,183
Michigan 193,536 2,443,473 2,249,937
Minnesota 92,780 1,171,387 1,078,607
Mississippi 54,068 682,625 628,558
Missouri 106,968 1,350,515 1,243,546
Montana 17,402 219,703 202,301
Nebraska 32,808 414,218 381,409
Nevada 33,203 419,202 385,999
New Hampshire 23,221 293,177 269,956
New Jersey 159,457 2,013,212 1,853,755
New Mexico 34,251 432,438 398,186
New York 359,142 4,534,307 4,175,165
North Carolina 147,029 1,856,296 1,709,267
North Dakota 12,690 160,221 147,530
Ohio 221,505 2,796,583 2,575,078
Oklahoma 65,683 829,273 763,590
Oregon 64,225 810,872 746,646
Pennsylvania 238,006 3,004,915 2,766,910
Rhode Island 19,552 246,857 227,305
South Carolina 74,457 940,045 865,589
South Dakota 14,613 184,493 169,880
Tennessee 106,298 1,342,050 1,235,752
Texas 384,925 4,859,834 4,474,909
Utah 40,774 514,787 474,013
Vermont 11,663 147,245 135,582
Virginia 133,342 1,683,499 1,550,157
Washington 111,093 1,402,591 1,291,498
West Virginia 35,955 453,947 417,992
Wisconsin 102,367 1,292,419 1,190,053
Wyoming 9,500 119,936 110,436
U.S. Totals 5,300,000 66,914,573 61,614,573
* Tamiflu availability projections are based on state-by-state proportional distribution of the 5.3 million courses of Tamiflu
ordered or currently in U.S. federal government possession.  For example, California, with approximately 12% of the U.S. pop-
ulation, receives 12% of the Tamiflu in the above projection.  The Number of Cases is the projected number of residents con-
tracting the flu, based on a 25% rate of contraction.  State population numbers are from FluAid, using U.S. Census data
gathered in 1999.  Updated population data were not used to ensure consistency with estimated Dead and Hospitalized
numbers.  The Number of Cases Without Tamiflu is the difference between the other two columns.
7In August 2004, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) released a
draft plan of U.S. strategy to deal with a flu pan-
demic.  The plan, an updated version of a 1978
plan, outlines proposed collaboration among
jurisdictions, as well as preparedness and
response guidelines for federal, state, and local
health officials.  The goals of the plan are to 1)
decrease the burden of disease; 2) minimize
social disruption; and 3) reduce economic
impact.24 The draft plan is accessible on the
HHS Web site at www.dhhs.gov/nvpo/pan-
demics.25 Related public comments on the
plan were accessible at the site in March 2005.
Questions for U.S. Pandemic Planning Efforts
 Is There Coordination Among Government,
Health, and Economic Infrastructures?
State, federal, and international efforts must
be coordinated, with instructions for specific
implementation.  Sufficient resources must
be allocated to match what is needed to carry
out the plan.  
Does the National Strategic Stockpile
Include ALL Necessary Medical Supplies
That Will Be Necessary to Respond to a
Pandemic?  In addition to stockpiling antivi-
rals and vaccines, when they are available,
the U.S. must also stockpile critical medical
supplies such as masks, gloves, gowns, bed
linens, and all other equipment needed to
assure that hospitals and other health care
providers are properly protected when the
usual supply chain is disrupted either
abroad or in the U.S.
 Are There Sufficient Surge Capacity
Capabilities?  A pandemic or other mass-
emergency scenario would overwhelm the
normal operations of hospitals and the
health care system.  Readiness efforts must
account for massive demand triggered by a
pandemic.  Local health officials and first
responders must be included in planning
efforts to maximize the on-the-ground abili-
ty to “scale up” capability in a rapid manner.
 Is There a Prioritization of Who Would
Receive Antivirals and Vaccines Based on
a Limited Supply?  Specific national guid-
ance must be established on vaccine prior-
itization, including developing guidelines
on the use of antiviral drugs and lists of
priority groups for vaccine receipt and dis-
tribution, given that there is likely to be
insufficient supplies during a pandemic. 
 Is There a Rapid Response Plan to Develop,
Test, and Produce a Vaccine?  It will take an
estimated six to nine months after a pandem-
ic emerges to develop a vaccine.  Questions of
how to rapidly review and test the vaccine
once it is created remain, including concerns
about speeding the approval process by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), liabil-
ity protection for vaccine manufacturers, and
what type of preservative will be used in the
vaccine.   In addition, industry representatives
have suggested that current production
capacity is insufficient to meet the demand
for a pandemic influenza vaccine, and that it
could take 12-18 months to meet appropriate
production levels.26
U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services Draft Pandemic Plan
BEYOND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, WE NEED A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH
THAT INCLUDES FAR MORE THAN DRAFTING OF GENERAL PLANS, AS SEVERAL COUNTRIES
AND STATES HAVE DONE. WE NEED A DETAILED OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT OF THE BEST
WAY TO GET THROUGH 12 TO 24 MONTHS OF A PANDEMIC.23
– Dr. Michael Osterholm, Director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy
“
”
8 Is There Clear Assignment of Who in the
Government Would Control and
Distribute Vaccine and Treatments?  Do
plans exist to stockpile stopgap antiviral
medications and vaccines, based on the
small supplies of drugs that will be avail-
able versus the expected need and
demand?  As was evident in the 2004 flu
season in the U.S. when there was a short-
age of available vaccine for the annual flu,
there is no centralized infrastructure to
control and monitor vaccine distribution.
 Are There Clear Plans to Communicate
and Inform the Public? Effective response
to a pandemic would require a clear
action plan for what information would
be made available to the public and on
what time frame.
 Are There Coordinated Plans for
Monitoring Outbreak and Managing
Containment? Coordinating containment
efforts requires sufficient surveillance and
tracking systems to monitor and detect out-
breaks, infected persons, and the vaccine
supply, as well as the ability to examine the
readiness of infected survivors to re-enter
the workplace.  Survivors as a volunteer
workforce would prove essential to helping
combat the pandemic, because they will
have developed immunity to the virus.   
 Congress has been increasingly concerned about the nation’s readiness to respond to 
pandemic and annual influenza.  Since convening in January, the 109th Congress has held 
a series of hearings on issues related to influenza, including:  
May 26, 2005, “The Threat of and Planning for Pandemic Flu,” House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, Health Subcommittee.
May 4, 2005, “The State of Readiness for the 2005-2006 Flu Season,” House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.
 April 12, 2005, “Pandemic Preparedness and Influenza Vaccine Supply -- CDC, NIAID and
the Office of the Secretary of HHS,” House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee
on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies.
 February 10, 2005, “The Perplexing Shift from Shortage to Surplus:  Managing This Season’s Flu
Shot Supply and Preparing for the Future,” House Committee on Government Reform.
 In May 2005, Congress passed supplemental appropriations legislation that made available
$25 million “for a coordinated program to prevent and control the spread of the avian
influenza virus.”27 In addition, $58 million was appropriated for the purchase of influenza
countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile.  These funds are expected, in part,
to be used to order an additional three million courses of Tamiflu, to bring the U.S. stock-
pile order up to 5.3 million courses of treatment.  
 In April 2005, U.S. Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) introduced the AVIAN Act of 2005, pro-
posed legislation that includes a mandate for the federal government to stockpile the antiviral
medication oseltamivir, commonly known as Tamiflu.28
 In April 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush approved use of quarantine in the event of an
outbreak of “influenza caused by novel or reemergent influenza viruses that are causing, or
have the potential to cause, a pandemic,” which includes, but is not limited to the H5N1 strain
of avian flu currently in Southeast Asia.29
 In April 2005, the U.S. Department of State issued an advisory statement about the avian flu
and announced it is taking measures to support the World Health Organization’s (WHO)
efforts to contain the outbreak.30  
 In March 2005, in the U.S. Department of State authorization bill (S.600), the U.S. Senate proposed
including $25 million for International Famine and Disaster Assistance to prevent and respond to a
possible outbreak of the avian flu and called for a task force to coordinate U.S. policy.31
RECENTLY, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN SEVERAL NOTABLE
STEPS TO BEGIN TO PREPARE FOR A POTENTIAL PANDEMIC.
9Similar questions can be asked about the level
of preparedness of state and local governments
for a pandemic.  America’s public health sys-
tem relies on a loosely affiliated network of
approximately 3,000 federal, state, and local
health agencies often working with private sec-
tor and professional health organizations.
State governments have primary responsibility
for the health of their citizens under U.S. law.
Therefore, a federal plan without ready-to-
implement state plans would be insufficient.
Most states have developed draft pandemic
response plans, but they are in widely differ-
ent phases of readiness.  A recent examina-
tion found that only between 25-30 states have
made their plans publicly available.33 Making
the plans publicly available is considered by
many experts as an essential feature of pan-
demic readiness in order to improve integra-
tion with other jurisdictions as well as to add a
level of accountability.  In fact, in comment-
ing on the draft U.S. pandemic influenza pre-
paredness plan, the WHO stated, “We feel
that in order to ensure broad commitment
for the plan, it is essential to involve the com-
munity in the planning process.”34
Pandemic planning efforts must incorporate local health departments and first responders in
plan development.  
While states have legal jurisdiction to oversee much of a pandemic plan’s contents, local
responders will be responsible for the related operational, on-the-ground implementation.
Surge capacity, antiviral prioritization, and outbreak tracking are among the areas especially
critical to plan for in the local context.  Additionally, a highly-dense urban area poses a partic-
ular danger because of the possibility of massive virus transmission.  
Local areas, in coordination with state and federal officials, need to prioritize pandemic prepa-
rations to ensure that implementation and first response is as seamless and effective as possible.  
CITY AND LOCAL PLANNING: ON-THE-GROUND AND FACING
UNIQUE PROBLEMS
‘WE REMAIN VERY VULNERABLE,’ SUMMARIZED ENERGY AND COMMERCE
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN JOE L. BARTON [(R-TEXAS)].  ‘THINK OF IT LIKE THIS --  A
BAD FLU OUTBREAK COULD KILL MORE AMERICANS THAN EITHER OR BOTH OF THE
LAST CENTURY’S WORLD WARS.’32
“
”
WE HAVE TO PLAN FOR THE WORST-CASE EVENT
– Dr. Jean Taylor, head of Maryland pandemic-planning efforts, Maryland Department of




National planners must focus on questions
surrounding stockpiling antivirals and stabiliz-
ing vaccine development to protect people in
the event of an outbreak. This is problematic
given the limited production capacity for
antivirals and vaccines in the U.S. and
throughout the world.36
Vaccine and Antiviral Medication Issues
In 1976, 37 U.S. companies manufactured vaccines.  In 2002, there were only three.
Reasons given for the decline are mostly economic:  
 Vaccine production can take decades of research and development and, according to
industry estimates, costs about $800 million per licensed vaccine.
 Concerns about liability impact manufacturers’ decisions to avoid vaccine production,
especially after the significant compensation claims that followed the swine flu immu-
nization program in the mid-1970s.
 Some companies also cite insufficient market size as reason to stay out of the vaccine market,
due to the current low incidence of many diseases in the U.S., such as tuberculosis.  The flu vac-
cine demand is particularly seen as unstable due to the unpredictability of the size and scope of
the market each year. 
 There are only two manufacturers currently licensed to produce influenza vaccines in the
U.S., and a third overseas manufacturer who supplies vaccine to the U.S.  One of the U.S.-
licensed manufacturers produces inactivated influenza vaccine and one manufacturer pro-
duces the live, attenuated vaccine administered through nasal spray.37
The October 2004 announcement that approximately half of the expected flu vac-
cine for the U.S. would not be available heightened public awareness about the
fragility of the public health system’s vaccine development system and national readi-
ness for a fast-moving influenza epidemic.
In early October, Chiron Corporation announced it would not be able to meet
demand for its flu vaccine after problems at a British plant halted production of mil-
lions of doses.  The dose shortage highlighted the fact that the U.S. relies on very
few manufacturers to deliver the country’s “projected need of 100 million doses.”38
As a result, CDC officials were forced to encourage changes in the nation’s distribu-
tion procedures for the flu vaccine supply, reserving doses only for the populations
most in need.  This illustrates the lack of coordination for the prioritization and distri-
bution of vaccines, particularly in a crisis.
The shortage resulted in a focus of media and public attention on the issue, long lines
at health clinics around the country, and calls for incentives, liability reforms, and
other measures to encourage a broader range of vaccine producers.
THE SHRINKING VACCINE MANUFACTURING MARKET
Flu Vaccine Crisis of 2004
11
Flu vaccines similar to those currently in use were first introduced during the 1940s.  Since
then, scientists have improved the standardization and purity of the process.  However, the
world remains dependent on the same basic technology that relies on inoculating the cur-
rent influenza virus strains into embryonated hens’ eggs for vaccine production.39
The influenza vaccine available each year is carefully engineered to respond to particular
strains of the flu judged most likely to emerge based on projections and the genetic com-
position of prior outbreaks. However, the creation of a vaccine to combat a particular flu
season is an annual “best guess” by virologists.  It takes approximately six to nine months
to develop yearly seasonal flu vaccines or vaccines for new strains of the disease.
Therefore, employing the currently used technology, there will be a lag time of at least six
to nine months before a vaccine will be available after a pandemic outbreak strikes.
There are new technologies being developed to produce flu vaccine, which involve cell cul-
tures, recombinant protein, and DNA-based approaches.  They may help produce influen-
za vaccine more efficiently and provide more adaptability to unexpected problems or loss-
es in production. The U.S. government has invested approximately $150 million over the
last two years to stimulate development of these new technologies.40 However, this tech-
nology will not be available for use in the immediate future, including within the timeframe
that most experts predict a pandemic outbreak will occur.
In the meantime, the federal government has invested $41 million to expand and maintain
the chicken flocks used by Sanofi Pasteur, the only company that has a U.S.-based influen-
za vaccine production facility.  The goal of the investment is to ensure that flocks can pro-
duce eggs year-round. 
OUTDATED TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPING FLU VACCINE
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In February 2005, WHO released a report rec-
ommending that nations around the world
stockpile antiviral medication to protect against
the current lethal avian strain of the flu.  The
WHO has recommended this as a “stopgap”
measure, since it would likely take a minimum
of six months to develop a vaccine after a wide-
spread outbreak.  Therefore, antiviral stockpil-
ing would be an essential interim step to have a
way to protect people if a pandemic outbreak
spread before a vaccine was developed.  While
health experts expect a pandemic will occur
soon, there is no way to forecast the exact tim-
ing.  The quantities of both the antiviral med-
ication and a vaccine, once one becomes avail-
able, would be limited and countries around
the world would all be seeking supplies.
An antiviral medication, oseltamivir, common-
ly known as Tamiflu, exists that could help alle-
viate symptoms of those who contract the
pandemic flu and reduce mortality levels.  It
can also be used as prophylaxis, or preventive
treatment, to help protect emergency first-
responders and front-line health care workers. 
The WHO estimates that a pandemic flu out-
break could impact approximately 25 percent
of the population in nations worldwide.
Unfortunately, there is limited production
capacity for this vital medication. 
The U.S. federal government reportedly has
ordered 5.3 million courses of Tamiflu for the
Strategic National Stockpile, however it would
require approximately 70 million courses to
cover 25 percent of the U.S. population.41
Several other countries have already ordered
enough Tamiflu to protect between 20-25
percent of their populations in case of an out-
break.  The U.S. is already behind in the
queue to place an order for the medication,
for which there is a single manufacturer
worldwide  --  Roche Pharmaceutical, which
is located in Switzerland.  In testimony before
the U.S. House of Representatives Health
Subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce
Committee, the medical director for Tamiflu
of the Roche company explained that histori-
cally they have not produced the levels of
Tamiflu required for global stockpiling.  To
help accommodate the growing concerns and
orders, they have increased production of the
antiviral nearly eight-fold since 2003.42
On March 1, 2005, the British government
announced that it was taking steps to procure
14.6 million courses of Tamiflu.43 This pro-
curement would cover 25 percent of the
British population, the rate WHO has recom-
mended.  
Given the current and projected production
capacity, if the U.S. did place a large order for
Tamiflu, Roche has testified before Congress
that it could be the end of 2007 before they
could deliver enough to the national stockpile
for 25 percent of the population.  Thus, antivi-
ral treatment will only be an effective part of
the U.S. response if a pandemic does not occur
for several years and, of course, if the pandem-
ic strain is responsive to antiviral medications.
STOPGAP ANTIVIRAL MEASURES ARE POSSIBLE TO PROTECT
PEOPLE IN THE SIX TO NINE MONTHS OR MORE IT WOULD TAKE
TO DEVELOP A VACCINE FOR A NEW, LETHAL FLU VIRUS STRAIN
“Roche has received and is filing on schedule, pandemic stockpile order for Tamiflu from 25 countries
worldwide.  Discussions are underway for the U.S. government to purchase significantly greater
amounts of Tamiflu.  However, HHS stockpile purchases to date are sufficient to treat less than one
percent of the U.S. population.  We have also received a non-binding letter of intent for HHS to
purchase additional treatments to cover under 2 percent of the population.  
In contrast, countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Finland, Norway, Switzerland, and 
New Zealand are ordering enough Tamiflu to cover between 20 and 40 percent of their populations.
Unfortunately, given the complexities I have described and the increasing global demand, any 
government that does not stockpile sufficient quantities of Tamiflu in advance cannot be assured of 
an adequate supply at the outbreak of an influenza pandemic.”44
– Dr. Dominick Iacuzio, Medical Director for Tamiflu at Roche in testimony before the 
U.S. House of Representatives Health Subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce
Committee on May 26, 2005.
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Tamiflu and other antiviral medications have shelf life considerations.  The FDA has cur-
rently approved a five year shelf life for Tamiflu.  In the event that a pandemic does not
occur within the five year window for use of the stockpiled reserve of the drug, the U.S.
and other countries can still make use of the Tamiflu they have ordered for use against
annual regular flu concerns before it expires.
Shelf life concerns of antiviral medications, that are part of the Strategic National Stockpile,
however, need to be taken into consideration.  Budgeting to replace the reserve of med-
ications that have been determined to be essential to protecting Americans in the event of
emergencies need to be factored into ongoing homeland and health security discussions.
STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE AND ONGOING 
ANTIVIRAL CONCERNS
THE NEXT PANDEMIC IS IMMINENT ... (AND WE) ... ARE NOT PREPARED.  
VACCINE AVAILABILITY IS NOT SECURED.  ANTIVIRAL STOCKS DO NOT EXIST AND
WILL NOT BE UNDER THE CURRENT MARKET FORCES.  IN THE EVENT OF A PANDEMIC
MILLIONS OF PEOPLE COULD DIE, ECONOMIES COULD BE AFFECTED AND MEDICAL
AND CIVIL SERVICES COULD COLLAPSE.  MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC WILL NOT EXCUSE
AUTHORITIES, WHO WILL BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR NOT HAVING PUT IN PLACE
UP-TO-DATE PREPAREDNESS.45
– The European Commission, November 27, 2001
“
”
U.S. planning and preparedness for a pandemic lags behind a number of other countries.  Below
is a comparison of the U.S. versus the U.K. and Canadian efforts across a number of dimensions.
While the preparations in the U.K. and Canada compare favorably to the U.S., some public health
experts still raise concerns about the degree of implementation-readiness in their efforts.














dination mechanism in place;
Secretary of HHS receives
daily briefings; within HHS
divided authority between
pandemic preparedness
(Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Health) and
pandemic response (Office
of the Assistant Secretary for
Emergency Preparedness). 
Guidance provided to states
for planning purposes; no
release or systematic review
of local plans.
Draft plan released August
2004 for public comment;
no timeline for finalized plan.
NIH-funded research on 
pandemic vaccine; initial 
contracts for building 
potential vaccine stockpile.  
Significant portion of US
vaccine supply manufactured
abroad.
HHS soliciting public comment
on prioritization for receipt of
limited supply of vaccine.
5.3 million courses of antivi-
ral ordered for stockpile
(two percent of population).
HHS soliciting public com-
ment on prioritization for
distribution of limited supply.
Planning guidance provided
for health care system.






“civil society” efforts.  
Department of Health leads
public health and National
Health Service response.
Similar plans adopted and
coordinated with Scotland,





Prototype “dossier” for reg-
ulatory approval of pandemic




Most UK vaccine production
occurs in the UK.
Priority groups for vaccina-
tion identified in plan.
Courses to cover 25 per-
cent of the U.K. population
have been ordered. 
Priority groups for antiviral
treatment identified.
U.K. has integrated health
care system through National
Health Service and local
Primary Care Trusts, under
direct leadership of U.K.
Department of Health
Specific professional
(provider), public and media
communications messages
and activities identified by











production capacity for a
pandemic vaccine with a
Canadian manufacturing
facility.
Priority groups for vacci-
nation identified in plan.
Courses ordered to
cover three percent of
the Canadian population.   
Priority groups for antivi-
ral treatment identified.
Checklist of activities
issued for surge capacity
preparation.
Checklist of activities by
stage of pandemic issued.
NEW CONCERN:  BIRDS
TO PIGS TO HUMANS?
According to a May 2005
edition of Nature Magazine,
scientists are increasingly
concerned that a “dangerous
strain” of the avian flu virus
may be growing in pigs in
Indonesia.46 Pigs are known
to serve as a “mixing vessel”
that incubate strains of dis-
ease that become more easi-
ly transmissible to humans.47
SOUTHEAST ASIA’S
CONTAINMENT CAPACITY
Southeast Asia, the epicen-
ter of the avian influenza
outbreak, has a poor capaci-
ty to contain a pandemic if
one should emerge.  A pan-
demic would overwhelm the
capabilities of local Asian
health departments.  With
their insufficient capacity
and technology, much of
Southeast Asia’s ability to
detect and monitor the out-
break is severely limited.  As
a result, the U.S. must also
decide how it will assist the
world community in respond-
ing to the threat  --  and
prepare for the worst.
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How prepared the U.S. and the rest of the
world are to respond to and control a pan-
demic will be determined by how much time
remains until an outbreak occurs.
Preparations must be considered without
knowing this exact timeframe.  Scientists pre-
dict it could happen as soon as this year, or it
could take several years.  Therefore, plan-
ning and policies must consider what would
need to be done if an outbreak occurred very
soon or with longer lead time to prepare.  
 Crucial immediate steps that must be
taken to minimize loss if a pandemic
occurs in the near term include outbreak
tracking, stockpiling medical supplies,
and communications plans. 
 Intermediate steps that must be consid-
ered if a pandemic occurs with several years
to prepare include stockpiling antivirals and
developing additional surge capacity plans
for hospitals and other medical providers.
 Longer-range steps that should be
undertaken if there are a number of years
to prepare include increasing vaccine
production and the development of new
technologies for vaccines.  
Whether a pandemic emerges from the
H5N1 virus or a different strain, the chal-
lenge remains constant.  Responding quick-
ly and effectively to a pandemic requires a
comprehensive national plan integrated
with state and local-based emergency plan-
ning efforts.  Though wider national atten-
tion and a general acknowledgement of the
virus’s danger are important developments,
specific U.S. pandemic planning efforts are
in need of immediate attention.  A review of
both the federal pandemic plan and state
pandemic plans found that many important
planning topics remain under-addressed.
Shoring up these weaknesses should be the
highest of government priorities.  In the
interim, every effort should be made by the
federal government to procure the antivi-
rals as a stopgap measure.
To move towards operational plans capable
of wider integration and implementation,
and as a first step towards a strong, cohesive,
and rapid-preparation U.S. pandemic flu
strategy, TFAH recommends the following
activities be addressed in federal, state, and
local preparedness efforts:
Recommendations
U.S. PANDEMIC READINESS WILL DEPEND ON IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM
STRATEGIES AS WELL AS DEDICATED, INFORMED FEDERAL LEADERSHIP. 
– Congressman Jerry Lewis (R-CA), Chairman of the Appropriations Committee of 
the U.S. House of Representatives
“ ”
THERE IS A TIME IN THE LIFE OF EVERY PROBLEM WHEN IT IS BIG ENOUGH TO SEE
AND SMALL ENOUGH TO SOLVE.  FOR FLU PREPAREDNESS, THAT TIME IS NOW.48
– U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt, May 16, 2005   
Overall, U.S. pandemic preparedness is inadequate. Both the federalpandemic plan and various state pandemic plans are insufficient blue-
prints for an effective national response to a pandemic influenza.  
“ ”
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 Define Roles and Responsibilities
A clearly-defined organizational structure and
chain of command is essential for rapid and
efficient control and response, both in the fed-
eral government and at the state level.  At the
federal level, the President should designate a
single senior official whose primary responsi-
bility is to assure Cabinet-level coordination of
the federal government’s response to a pan-
demic and also to ensure coordination
between civil society (non-governmental eco-
nomic infrastructure) and government dur-
ing a pandemic.  Immediate planning should
be occurring at the federal level to minimize
disruption of the health care system and the
overall economy.  CDC must review and
approve of state pandemic plans to ensure
nationwide preparedness standards and
regional coordination.  States must define and
agree upon leadership roles and responsibili-
ties with respect to who is in charge of a state’s
public health and health care decisions.  Plans
must also designate liaisons to work with other
jurisdictions and federal officials.  
 Outbreak Tracking
Plans should ensure adequate laboratory sur-
veillance of influenza, including the ability to
isolate and subtype influenza viruses year-
round.  Following federal guidelines outlined
by HHS, states should report all necessary data
and information to federal and other health
officials as soon as it becomes available.
Congress should provide additional support
for CDC’s global surveillance activities, and
the U.S. should support the WHO’s surveil-
lance program to assure as early a warning as
possible for U.S. preparedness purposes.
 Vaccine Research, Development, 
and Production
The U.S. should continue to support and
expand research into new technologies for
influenza vaccine and clinical trials for
potential avian flu and other pandemic vac-
cines.  While the U.S. has issued limited con-
tracts for stockpiling a potential pandemic
vaccine, the federal government should also
explore the Canadian approach of contract-
ing for a reserve production capacity located
in the U.S.  A vaccine stockpiling approach is
successful if public health authorities have
guessed correctly on what the pandemic
strain will be.  A reserve production capacity
can assure quick turnaround for production
of a vaccine for the actual pandemic strain.  
Prior to production, the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) must approve a
new vaccine.  Other nations are putting pro-
tocols in place now with respect to creating
a rapid review process for a pandemic flu
vaccine.  With clear advance notice of the
scientific data that will be required for
approval from regulatory agencies, vaccine
manufactures can better anticipate how to
comply.  For example, regulators in the U.K.
are already working with vaccine manufac-
tures to develop a model application for
approval of a pandemic vaccine, which they
estimate could reduce production time by as
much as two months.  The U.S. FDA should
adopt a similar strategy.
 Procure Additional Antivirals 
for Treatment
Even during a pandemic, when efforts to
contain transmission may seem futile, there
exists a capacity to treat infected individuals.
While the ultimate effectiveness of treatment
depends on the particular strain, Tamiflu
may be an effective treatment option while
scientists work on the development of a vac-
cine.  Furthermore, Tamiflu can be used
prophylactically to protect hospital and
health care workers on the front lines.
The recently enacted emergency supplemen-
tal appropriations legislation made available
$58 million for the purchase of influenza
countermeasures for the Strategic National
Stockpile, including, but not limited to, antivi-
ral medications and vaccines.  These funds
are most welcome, but TFAH believes that
Congress should provide additional funds
during the FY 2006 appropriations cycle to
continue to build the nation’s antiviral stock-
piles from the current level of two percent of
the U.S. population to cover a higher per-
centage of the population.
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Mass Vaccination and Treatment Systems
The federal government, in coordination
with the states, must develop systems for
tracking and distributing antiviral medica-
tion and vaccines.  A national system is need-
ed to assure targeted and/or equitable distri-
bution of supply, so we do not have a repeat
of the 2004-2005 flu season distribution prob-
lems.  State-level systems also are needed to
assure similar availability across a state.  One
of the best ways to improve vaccination
preparations for a pandemic outbreak may
be to enhance annual flu vaccination cover-
age for non-traditional high-risk groups (e.g.
individuals with chronic diseases or compro-
mised immune systems) to facilitate access to
these populations during a pandemic.
 Prioritize Who Would Receive Antivirals
and Vaccines Based on Limited Supplies
It is important to determine a protocol for
allocation among high priority populations,
such as health care workers, prior to an out-
break.  The federal government should pro-
vide specific guidance to states as to which
sectors of the population should receive
antiviral medications and vaccines, and in
what order, particularly since the amount of
available pharmaceuticals will be limited.
 Public Information Campaigns 
and Materials
Communicating with the public in a clear
and efficient manner is essential during a
high-anxiety time.  The federal government,
in conjunction with the states, should devel-
op coordinated messages for various audi-
ences (media, public, providers, etc.) for
each stage of a potential pandemic.  States
must identify and train spokespersons in
multiple languages and educate public
health officials, politicians, community lead-
ers, partners, and the media about what
information will and will not be available
during a pandemic.  States should ensure
clear and consistent messaging by creating
information templates in multiple lan-
guages ready for customization and distri-
bution during a pandemic.
 Stockpile Medical and Safety
Equipment for Health Care Workers
and First Responders
Efforts must be undertaken to ensure that
basic medical and safety equipment will be
available for health care workers and emer-
gency responders in the event of a major
outbreak.  Currently, most health providers
order and stock supplies on a “just-in-time”
basis.  This means they often only have a few
days of reserve supplies, equipment, and
medicines, including many basic protective
items, such as masks, gloves, gowns, and
clean hospital linens. In order to prepare
for a mass event, steps must be taken imme-
diately to stockpile additional supplies, par-
ticularly since during an outbreak, many
production and delivery systems for supplies
will likely be stalled or even stopped.
 Surge Capacity Capabilities
Plans must account for the likelihood that
hospitals will be quickly overwhelmed dur-
ing a pandemic, by developing auxiliary
sites such as shelters, schools, nursing
homes, hotels, and daycare centers for surge
capacity treatment and for treatment of the
“walking well.”  States should be conducting
surveys of potential sites and obtaining
agreements.  Cooperation and integration
with local health officials and first respon-
ders is essential. 
 Secure a Backup Workforce 
States should conduct and maintain an
inventory of healthcare professional resi-
dents, including current and retired doctors,
nurses, veterinarians, emergency medical
staff, and other potential volunteers.  These
workers could be an essential expanded
workforce during a pandemic.  Pandemic
survivors are also a population of potential
workers.  States should plan for tracking and
soliciting volunteer support from this popu-
lation, which is presumably immune to the
virus.  Planning efforts should also incorpo-
rate private sector support whenever possi-
ble, especially in infrastructure and non-
health service provider capacities.
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 Ensure Availability of Food, Water, and
Other Supplies 
States must account for high demand for
food, water, and other basic supplies, and
plan for distribution to general and hard-to-
reach populations.  Plans should factor in
potential complications of infected food and
delivery workers, possible infected store facil-
ities, and limitations on public interaction
both for those infected and the general pop-
ulation at risk of exposure.  Planners must
also weigh the issue of “just-in-time” manu-
facturing of food and supplies, since reserves
of supplies will not be available.  Additionally,
planners must address the limitations of
medical equipment manufacturing, much of
which Asia exports to the world.
 Quarantine Measures and Authority to
Close Public Places
States must establish clear legal authority
and emergency measures to effectively con-
tain the spread of disease.  States must have
powers to prohibit public gatherings, close
public facilities and schools, and restrict
travel, if necessary.  
 Measures to Manage Mass Death
Planning for worst-case scenarios is a critical
component of effective planning.  States
must conduct and maintain an inventory of
facilities with sufficient refrigerated storage
to serve as temporary morgues in the event
of a pandemic.
As indicated, there are several concrete
steps that the U.S. can take to better prepare
against an influenza pandemic.  Such poli-
cies and investments will help stabilize the
nation’s health and economy in the event of
a pandemic while ensuring that pandemic
readiness preparations are “commensurate
with the scale of the threat we face.”49
REPORT AUTHORS
Margaret A. Hamburg, MD
Vice President for Biological Programs
NTI
Shelley A. Hearne, DrPH
Executive Director
Trust for America’s Health
Jeffrey Levi, PhD
Senior Policy Advisor
Trust for America’s Health
Kim Elliott, MA
Deputy Director
Trust for America’s Health
Laura M. Segal, MA
Director of Public Affairs
Trust for America’s Health
Michael J. Earls
Public Affairs Associate
Trust for America’s Health
PEER REVIEWERS
The opinions expressed in this report do not
necessarily reflect the views of the peer review-
ers.  TFAH greatly appreciates the reviewers’
time and insights.
Michael Osterholm, PhD, MPH
Director, Center for Infectious Disease
Research and Policy, and Professor, School of
Public Health
University of Minnesota
Alonzo Plough, PhD, MPH
Vice President, Program, Planning, and
Evaluation 
The California Endowment 
(Effective July 18, 2005)
19
Appendix A: State-by-State Range of Potential Pandemic Influenza
Deaths and Hospitalizations* 
Projected Dead Projected Hospitalized
State 25% contraction, 25% contraction, 25% contraction, 25% contraction, 
lower severity high severity lower severity high severity 
flu deaths flu deaths hospitalizations hospitalizations 
Alabama 2,962 17,771 12,863 77,178
Alaska 295 1,771 1,519 9,114
Arizona 3,074 18,446 13,225 79,350
Arkansas 1,783 10,700 7,553 45,318
California 20,292 121,750 91,030 546,180
Colorado 2,397 14,383 10,993 65,958
Connecticut 2,351 14,107 9,978 59,868
Delaware 502 3,014 2,187 13,122
District of Columbia 385 2,310 1,658 9,948
Florida 11,912 71,474 47,462 284,772
Georgia 4,552 27,309 20,970 125,820
Hawaii 815 4,892 3,524 21,144
Idaho 760 4,558 3,385 20,310
Illinois 7,907 47,439 34,579 207,474
Indiana 3,939 23,634 17,237 103,422
Iowa 2,078 12,465 8,697 52,182
Kansas 1,791 10,746 7,648 45,888
Kentucky 2,643 15,859 11,583 69,498
Louisiana 2,778 16,668 12,383 74,298
Maine 884 5,302 3,778 22,668
Maryland 3,319 19,916 14,833 88,998
Massachusetts 4,379 26,271 18,679 112,074
Michigan 6,541 39,244 28,668 172,008
Minnesota 3,101 18,608 13,596 81,576
Mississippi 1,787 10,723 7,844 47,064
Missouri 3,758 22,548 16,080 96,480
Montana 601 3,608 2,595 15,570
Nebraska 1,147 6,882 4,899 29,394
Nevada 1,081 6,486 4,819 28,914
New Hampshire 778 4,665 3,434 20,604
New Jersey 5,660 33,960 24,264 145,584
New Mexico 1,081 6,488 4,835 29,010
New York 12,567 75,401 54,163 324,978
North Carolina 4,996 29,973 21,880 131,280
North Dakota 457 2,742 1,931 11,586
Ohio 7,732 46,393 33,326 199,956
Oklahoma 2,278 13,666 9,792 58,752
Oregon 2,241 13,447 9,682 58,092
Pennsylvania 9,062 54,369 37,553 225,318
Rhode Island 745 4,467 3,087 18,522
South Carolina 2,491 14,947 10,995 65,970
South Dakota 520 3,118 2,199 13,194
Tennessee 3,625 21,750 15,893 95,358
Texas 11,708 70,247 53,550 321,300
Utah 1,131 6,786 5,302 31,812
Vermont 395 2,369 1,738 10,428
Virginia 4,368 26,207 19,624 117,744
Washington 3,637 21,820 16,204 97,224
West Virginia 1,350 8,097 5,671 34,026
Wisconsin 3,540 21,240 15,281 91,686
Wyoming 305 1,830 1,363 8,178
TOTALS 180,478 1,082,866 786,032 4,716,192
* Projections based on CDC’s FluAid 2.0 program.  The estimated deaths and hospitalizations assume the
following:  The projections range from the most likely number of deaths and hospitalizations at a 25%
rate of contraction for a relatively mild pandemic, similar to the 1968 pandemic, to the most likely num-
ber of deaths and hospitalizations for a more severe pandemic, similar to the 1918 pandemic. 
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